I personally interpret the design model of disability as an extension of the social model. The social model recognizes disability as the result of discrimination and exclusion perpetuated by ableist public policies, inaccessible education and infrastructure, abusive or dismissive practices of employers, legal guardians, medical-authorities, and other non-disabled people. Extending from social model’s conceptual foundation which recognizes external disabling factors, the design model zooms in on how the designed environments, objects, services, and interfaces can disable or enable someone.
While the social model critiques the structural barriers that challenge disability rights on a higher level, the design model focuses on actionable things we can do by incorporating professional knowledge and technological innovation to destigmatize disability (Williamson and Guffey 5). On that note, the design model is more pragmatic and optimistic as it emphasizes everyone’s active agency in working towards the inclusion of marginalized communities. The similarities and difference between the social model and the design model reminds me of the “critique-repair” spectrum from our class discussion. For me, the social model leans towards “critique” while the design model leans toward “repair”, a process fueled by interrogating, adapting, and innovating the relationships between bodies and materials.
However, I do agree with Shew’s critique of how techno-ableism focusing on the restorative capability of tech-driven design can risk misleading the design model (Williamson & Guffey 6). I found the similar shortsightedness in the framing of “cyborg embodiment” when Halstead refers to the seamless integration of assistive technologies with bodies, or the “device-assisted disabled person as the ‘original cyborg’” (Halstead 18). Firstly, “cyborg embodiment” has an undertone that idolizes and sensationalizes technology as an omnipotent problem-solver, while it obviously is not. Additionally, instead of recognizing disability as inherent to human diversity, the techno-fetishist aesthetics of “cyborg embodiment” redeems and normalizes the bodies of device-assisted disabled person through the facade of progress and enhancement signified by technologies – aka, cool technologies excuse disability to be more socially and aesthetically “acceptable”. And as Shew suggested, this framing implies that disabled bodies “not properly equipped with these technologies” become inferior (Williamson & Guffey 6). I find it frustrating that the capital-driven focus on hyped cyborgian innovation can ignore the crude realities of disabled users who struggle to sustain their day-to-day routine (Halstead 19).